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Abstract: 
This paper assesses and describes the various prevailing infrastructure financing 
mechanisms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This study, through a multi-country regression 
panel framework of the top 10 recipients of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) investments 
in Sub-Saharan African between 1991 and 2014, finds that government budget constraints, 
macroeconomic conditions and institutional quality are significant determinants of 
infrastructure finance. Policy implications are that SSA governments need to focus on 
building and maintaining sound fiscal and monetary discipline. Institutional factors cannot 
be ignored in this process, as these are critical to creating an environment that is conducive 
to building trust and reducing risk perceptions for potential investors as well as providing the 
room for innovative solutions. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
1.1 Linking infrastructure and economic growth 
Within the private and public sector, infrastructure development is fundamental for 
economic growth, Fedderke and Garlick (2008). Esfahani & Ramírez (2003) point out that 
improvement in investment and the performance of infrastructure, will in general have 
positive effects on economic growth. However, such a setting needs to be augmented by 
institutional and organizational reforms that are more fundamental than simply designing 
infrastructure projects and spending money on them.  
Calderon and Serven (2004) analyse the effects of infrastructure development on growth 
and income distribution. The finding is that the volume of infrastructure stock has a 
significant positive effect on long-run economic growth, infrastructure growth and 
simultaneously lowers income inequality. Using a cross-country approach, Sanchez-Robles 
(1998) concludes that there is a positive impact of public infrastructure expenditure on 
economic growth. However, Sanchez-Robles argues that in defining an optimal 
infrastructure policy, policymakers need to follow a cost-benefit analysis along with 
evaluating alternative intervention measures. 
Although significant economic performance strides have been made across Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), SSA’s long-term growth has been slow relative to other developing countries. 
SSA has experienced less than half of the average growth and about half of average 
investment efficiency levels obtained in other developing regions, Ndulu (2006) and 
Estache A., Speciale, B., & Veredas, D. (2005). The major bottlenecks to faster, improved 
and evenly distributed growth for the SSA region lie in the infrastructure gap. Identifying 
sources of funding to bridge this infrastructure gap becomes the main challenge for 
policymakers and business practitioners. 
In line with the above, because of the fundamental role that infrastructure development 
plays for long-term economic growth, this paper assesses and describes the various 
prevailing infrastructure financing mechanisms in SSA. Furthermore, this paper examines 
whether alternative funding strategies are optimal. 
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1.2 Context of the study 
One of the main challenges Africa faces is the lack of infrastructure growth and this 
continues to negatively impact on economic growth. In this section, typical conventional 
facts about some of the infrastructure challenges that different sectors face in Africa are 
outlined.  Challenges within the power generation, telecommunications, transportation, 
water supply and sanitation sectors are among some of the matters that will be discussed.  
1.2.1 Facts about Sub Saharan Africa’s Infrastructure Needs: 
Evaluating the power generation sector shows that Africa is the only region whose per 
capita consumption of electricity is decreasing. This is evident by comparing Spain which 
has a population of 45 million and it generates the same amount of power as all of Africa’s 
power combined and Africa has a population of approximately 1 billion, see Eberhard and 
Gratwick (2015). 
According to a McKinsey Report (Roxburgh, 2010), using an electricity demand driven 
approach, SSA needs capital investments of USD835 billion by 2040 to meet the growing 
demand of its electricity requirement. Currently, power outages are a common occurrence 
in SSA and this highlights the lack of generation capacity and regular electricity supply.  
Nevertheless, the McKinsey Report results are supported by the following factors: 
 The growth in number of households (West Africa is increasing at rates of 2.4% per 
annum),  
 The urbanization rate (approximately 50% of SSA’s population is expected to 
migrate to urban centres by 2040 compared to 38% in 2010),  
 Electrification rates (current rates are hovering on the 35% mark with prospects of a 
rate of 71% by 2040), 
 Consumption levels per household (with increasing wealth levels, household 
consumption is also expected to increase by 30% by 2040).  
 
Another infrastructure aspect consistent with trends in Africa is the rapid growth in 
telecommunications. Since the year 2000, mobile firms have signed up more than 316 
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million phone subscribers, which is greater than the entire United States of America 
population (Roxburgh, 2010). Paired with this is tower infrastructure, allowing for GSM 
signal access, which has risen over 50% since 1999. Compared to developing nations 
SSA’s infrastructure has not lagged significantly. However, SSA’s broadband access still 
remains underpenetrated and is still expensive by global standards.  
In the context of the transportation sector, most African populations live in landlocked 
countries with sparse road densities. According to Ncube (2010), the percentage of paved 
roads in Sub-Saharan Africa is about 13% compared with 25.1% in East Asia and Pacific, 
and 27% in Latin America and Caribbean regions. This inherently generates spill over 
effects on the ease of efficient intra-Africa trade. What further complicates the transport 
deficit in SSA is the below-average air transport provision in world standards. Accessing 
West Africa in many instances requires connecting flights through Europe. 
With water supply, Africa has limited storage and irrigation infrastructure and this usually 
results in underutilised resources. Although Africa has vast natural endowments with 
respect to water, the limited storage and irrigation infrastructure creates a scenario of 
underutilised resources. According to a 2012 United Nations report, LATAM has 91% 
improved access to sources of drinking water whilst SSA has around 61%. The report 
further explains that 69% of the SSA population still do not have improved sanitation 
facilities access and whilst the share of the population practising open defecation has 
declined, there is an increasing trend in total numbers moving from 188 million in 1990 to 
224 million in 2008. 
The World Bank estimates the total cost of Africa’s infrastructure requirement to be USD 75 
billion per year driven by a deficit of about USD38 billion of investment per year, and a 
further USD37 billion per year in operations and maintenance. This translates to a total 
required spending of close to 12% of Africa’s GDP with a funding shortfall of USD35 billion 
per year (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Figure 1.1 illustrates Africa’s infrastructure 
gap relative to BRIC countries with respect to power and transport. African countries have 
lower kilowatt-hours per person generation capacity in comparison to the BRIC countries 
except for South Africa. When looking at the data at an aggregate level, on average BRIC 
countries generate 2.4 more kilowatt-hours per person than Africa. This serves to further 
highlight the significant lag in power generation capacity in Africa. Road infrastructure 
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paints a grimmer picture of the gap, with road density in Africa countries on average being 
close to 5 times sparser than BRIC countries. Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are however 
not too far from the BRIC road density average. 
Figure 1-1: Africa vs. BRICs Infrastructure GAP 
 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the number of completed infrastructure projects per region 
from 1990 to 2013.  Within this period Latin America and East Asia (considered as 
economic peers of SSA), exceeded SSA’s number of infrastructure projects threefold, with 
their prime focus being on the power and transport sectors.  
These descriptive statistics point to a much-needed review of the supply of long term capital 
for Africa, both in terms of infrastructure but more importantly in closing the power deficit. 
Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) highlight that close to 60% of the funding gap relates 
to the power gap. 
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Table 1-1: Regions ranked by number of projects, 1990-2013 
Region Power Telecom Transport Water and 
sewerage 
Grand 
Total 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
881 81 383 474 1819 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
441 293 76 46 856 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
901 152 566 275 1894 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
44 48 35 26 153 
South Asia 548 77 450 15 1090 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
166 205 102 28 501 
Grand Total 2981 856 1612 864 6313 
Source: World Bank 2014, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database 
1.3 Motivation of the study 
There has been a renaissance in the economic and political importance of SSA as a 
destination of investment expenditure and infrastructure development has been a prominent 
factor in shaping dialogue in this regard. As an example, the Government of South Africa 
and the European Union have established a ZAR1.5 billion fund called the Infrastructure 
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Investment Programme for South Africa (IIPSA). The primary of the programme is to 
provide financing through EU grants and concessional loans from participating 
Development Finance Institutions. Development of national and regional infrastructure 
projects is an evolving feature of IIPSA.  
With this increased focus and demand it is therefore critical to ensure that there exists a 
body of academic literature that explores SSA’s key challenges with regards to 
infrastructure financing and innovative recommendations to remedy them. The aim of the 
study is to place further impetus to the development of sound infrastructure financing 
strategies in SSA. It also will aim at providing practitioners with the necessary tools to 
assess viable options in this regard. 
Increasingly African governments have become reliant on Private Public Partnerships 
(PPP) and Private Participation Investments (PPI) to attract infrastructure funding. The 
terms of engagement have varied from full financial exposure to cover the underlying cost 
to other forms of fiscal support such as: guarantees, in-kind grants, and tax-breaks 
(Izaguirre & Kulkarni, 2011). As an example of this in 2012, 12 African heads of state 
approved the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) that calls 
government, business and private donors to foster new partnership methods to execute on 
the 51 Priority Action Plan (PAP) infrastructure projects across multi-sectors through 2012 
to 2020.  
In this context, Ehlers (2014) has argued that there ought to be a legal framework for PPP 
or creation of specialized governmental agencies to finance infrastructure projects, as it is 
one of the critical roles the government ought to fulfil. He continues to assert the notion that 
the use of private sector financing hinges on a sensible transfer of risks and returns, 
although its involvement along with the public sector may improve efficiency due to the 
sharing of skills. Yet there are findings that infrastructure bonds and loans seem most 
desirable to diversify risk, provide transparent capital market instruments, while developing 
countries need to make use of development banks and export credit to promote the 
financing of infrastructure. 
To help scale up and complement existing facilities within African infrastructure financing, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB) has been embarking on various activities ranging 
from basic lending, advisory services, and development equity. This is achieved through a 
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financing facility that is structured as a mechanism for funding access as well as a 
systematic arm for addressing challenges with project finance in Africa (World Economic 
Forum, 2013). 
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review 
This section provides a broad literature review on infrastructure financing and other 
alternative avenues that are available for SSA. Thus, the literature review provides an 
overview on the following components: Public sector infrastructure financing, sovereign 
wealth funds, development finance institutions, private infrastructure finance, public private 
partnerships, project finance, project bonds, institutional investors and the role of China in 
infrastructure finance. 
The term “infrastructure” has evolved over time, and with that a conventional acceptance of 
broadly dividing the term under two categories, namely economic and social. Economic 
infrastructure typically includes transport, communications, power generation, water supply 
and sanitation facilities. 1 
Infrastructure finance projects often comprise of a web of complex contract structures and 
have various distinct phases with different risk profiles and return characteristics (Ehlers, 
2014). Ehler further describes the different phases of the infrastructure finance as being 
Planning, Construction and Operational. This implies that funding for the same project can 
go through multiple forms and the various stakeholders need to be critically aware of which 
funding mechanism is relevant at which stage to ensure seamless conclusion of the 
projects. The selection of the correct funding source is a function of the undercurrents of the 
economic and political frameworks. Thus mutual public and private engagement becomes 
key to ensuring the success of the corporative initiatives.  
Figure 2.1 derived by Inderst (2013) outlines a graphical representation of the standard 
funding sources available for infrastructure projects.  
 
                                            
1
 On the other hand social infrastructure includes educational and health-care facilities, though some authors include cultural and 
recreational facilities (Fedderke & Garlick, 2008). In the context of this paper, infrastructure finance will always refer to financing gaps in 
the context of economic infrastructure. 
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Figure 2-1: Infrastructure Finance Funding Sources 
 
Source: Inderst (2013) 
2.1 Public Sector Infrastructure financing in Africa 
Infrastructure finance provision in developing countries, particularly SSA, has been 
traditionally financed through the public sector, however the private sector share has 
improved in the recent years (Swaroop, 1994).  Swaroop also highlights that in the absence 
of an appropriate rate of return, services that require a single service provider due to 
economies of scale or such related reasons, would not be possible through purely private 
sector funding. SSA’s primary infrastructure requirements have typically been single service 
provider oriented (i.e. power generation, road and water sewerage works).  
In SSA the public sector remains the most important source of local financing, with the 
middle income countries predominantly basing their financing requirements on tax revenues 
and selective income streams from state owned enterprises. In lower income countries the 
public sector contributes approximately half of total spending and a third of this spending (or 
an equivalent of 1.5% of GDP) is attributable to capital investments (Briceño-Garmendia, 
Smits, and Foster 2008). 
In SSA over the 2006-09 period, there has been an equal split between public and private 
contributions to funding of PPI.  Most of the private funding has been directed to the 
telecommunications sector. Public sector funding has been concentrated in direct sourcing 
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from the government with the Gautrain light rail concession being the primary target of this 
funding at USD3.5 billion (Izaguirre & Kulkarni, 2011). 
The number of projects has been driven by public sector participation.  Close to 45% of the 
projects have received half of their funding from the public sector. Multilateral and bilateral 
agencies continue to interestingly feature key sources of funding in SSA providing 17% of 
the funding to PPI investment in new projects with most of this funding going to energy and 
transport projects. The energy sector has been funded by multilateral and bilateral agencies 
with a contribution of 54% of the direct funding to cover investment commitments in 2006–
09. The private sector has contributed 45% whilst government only funded 1% (Izaguirre & 
Kulkarni, 2011). 
Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz, 2005 make an observation that the need for infrastructure 
investment is a permanent requirement. Public-sector budgets have the onus both at a 
national level and municipal level to ensure prudent management and effective use of 
funds; a requirement is often not given the necessary attention that it deserves. 
In the early 1990s governments around the world began to involve the private sector in the 
provision and financing of infrastructure, which gave rise to public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). Few factors led to this trend; fiscal budget constraints to support long-term funding, 
lack of technical and managerial capacity within the public sector, rapid technological 
innovation and a growing need to mitigate against operational risk. Africa lagged behind in 
this trend, continuing to rely heavily on public sources of funding. (Harris, 2003) 
2.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) by convention have been traditionally formed and 
employed by countries with large commodity export revenues with the economic purpose of 
smoothing out inter-temporal consumption for economies, primarily a savings tool, and use 
as a stabilizing mechanism for reducing the impact of fiscal revenue and foreign exchange 
volatility. Africa as a whole has a relatively low number of SWFs totaling a meager count of 
17, with Nigeria’s newly established fund (Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority) reported 
to be USD 1.4 billion and Angola’s Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA) at USD 5 billion, 
the recent joiners.  
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Globally, SWFs increased investing in infrastructure from 47% in 2010 to 61% in 2011 
(Preqin, 2011). This serves to highlight an increased appreciation of the synergistic outputs 
required by SWFs and infrastructure development.  Kingombe (2011) asserts the potential 
of SWFs as a suitable source of infrastructure funding in Africa. Kingombe notes that SWFs 
are less restricted in their asset class allocation by design and are assessing opportunities 
for allocation of funds to non-traditional or alternatives assets, infrastructure in particular. 
Africa’s largest SWF, the Libyan Arab African Investment Company has invested over 
USD800 million in 13 African countries, (EIB, 2013).  
China in recent years has become an important source of infrastructure funding through the 
China Investment Corporation and the China-Africa development fund, an external SWF, 
with over 27 projects totaling USD540 million thus far. The key deviation from traditional 
funding is that Chinese funding is typically resource backed.  A noteworthy example is the 
“Angola Model”. This model financed through China’s Export Import Agency with Angola’s 
Ministry of Finance in 2004 included a total loan package of USD4.5 billion for 
reconstruction of infrastructure in Angola in exchange of a guarantee of a mutually pre-
agreed minimum daily supply of oil to China’s national oil corporation (Sinopec), a joint 
venture with Angola’s Sonangol (Kingombe, 2011). 
Traditional investments, which are typical fixed income and equity securities, are still 
ubiquitous with SWFs and continue to take a significant share of their portfolios. There is 
however a surge in alternative assets forming an integral share of the portfolios of many 
SWF investors over recent years. The primary reason is that the investor’s requirement for 
portfolio diversification and asset acquisition will generate higher yields and help them meet 
their long-term profitability objectives. Figure 2.2 below highlights that the proportion of 
African SWFs still invest primarily in Fixed Income and equities, however 33% of these 
SWFs are investing in alternative assets such as real estate and infrastructure. This ties in 
with the key mandates of SWFs to develop and expand their respective countries 
infrastructure stock. 
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Figure 2-2: Proportion of African Sovereign Wealth Funds investing in each asset 
class 
 
Source: Preqin 2015 
Triki and Faye, (2011) affirm that both North and Sub-Saharan Africa SWF investments are 
still highly concentrated in the real estate, hotels and hospitality sector. Furthermore, they 
observe that North Africa has seen more investments in the banking and financial sector, 
whilst foreign SWFs invested in the industrial sector and extractive industries in sub-
Saharan Africa. North Africa has received a larger share of foreign SWFs resources, mainly 
due to value clustering of large real estate and infrastructure projects.  
Participation of SWFs in infrastructure deals in SSA is increasingly becoming more 
important. There are some key noteworthy deals worth noting that highlight this experience 
in recent times. In South Africa, a consortium including Abengoa, Industrial Development 
Corporation and Public Investment Corporation acquired Xina Solar Power Plant, a 100 
MW concentrating solar power project located in Pofadder, in a deal worth USD908 million 
in 2014. Another notable deal, though contentious due to social and environmental issues, 
is the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project a 310MW Wind Power Project facility being 
developed 50 kilometres, north of the town of South Horr in Kenya by a large consortium of 
investors including Aldwych International, Finfund, IFU, KP&P Africa, Netherlands 
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Development Finance Company (FMO), Vestas Wind Systems. This deal worth USD870 
million was concluded in March 2014.  Table 2.1 highlights other top 5 notable deals for 
2015.  
The largest Africa focused fund, though privately owned, to date is the Pan African 
Infrastructure Development Fund II, which is looking to raise USD1.2 billion to invest in 
power, transport, water and sanitation, ICT and healthcare infrastructure across the 
continent. This fund is managed by Harith Fund Managers, a partnered of Kupanda Capital, 
which is a niche-focus investment platform that enables investors and businesses to plan, 
execute and manage their ventures in Africa. Should the fund successfully reach its target 
size, it would be the second largest Africa-focused vehicle of all time, behind Abraaj 
Infrastructure and Growth Capital Fund, which closed in December 2007 after attracting 
USD2 billion in institutional commitments. Other prominent Africa-focused include COMESA 
Infrastructure Fund, managed by PTA Bank, which targets investment in trade-related 
infrastructure projects within COMESA member states. The Pembani Remgro Infrastructure 
fund is another recently launched entity specializing in infrastructure investments. 
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Table 2-1: Notable Africa-Based Infrastructure deals completed in 2014 
Asset Location Industry Investors 
Deal 
Size 
(million) 
Stake Date 
Xina Solar 
Power Plant 
South 
Africa 
Solar Power 
Abengoa, Industrial Development Corporation, Public Investment 
Corporation 
908 USD 100% 
Jun-
14 
Lake Turkana 
Wind Power 
Project 
Kenya Wind Power 
Aldwych International, Finnfund, IFU, KP&P Africa, Netherlands 
Development Finance Company (FMO), Vestas Wind Systems 
870 USD 100% 
Mar-
14 
Azura-Edo 
IPP 
Nigeria Power Plants 
African Infrastructure Investment Managers, Aldwych International, 
Amaya Capital Partners, American Capital Energy & Infrastructure, 
ARM-Harith Infrastructure Investments 
750 USD 100% 
Mar-
14 
KaXu Solar 
Power Plant 
South 
Africa 
Solar Power Abengoa, Industrial Development Corporation 
7,500 
ZAR 
100% 
May-
14 
Kipeto Wind 
Farm 
Kenya Wind Power 
African Infrastructure Investment Managers, International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 
316 USD 100% 
Oct-
14 
 
Table 2-2: Notable Africa-Focused Unlisted Infrastructure Funds in market by target size 
Fund Firm Target Size (mn) Fund Status Manager Location 
Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund II Harith 1,200 USD First Close South Africa 
COMESA Infrastructure Fund PTA Bank 1,000 USD Raising Burundi 
Engross Fund I Cape Mount Management 800 USD Raising Bahrain 
Pembani Remgro Infrastructure Fund Pembani Remgro Infrastructure Managers 500 USD First Close South Africa 
Meridiam Infrastructure Africa Fund Meridiam 300 EUR First Close France 
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2.3 Development Finance Institutions  
Development Finance institutions (DFIs) have contributed significantly to infrastructure 
financing in SSA. By their construct, DFIs are typically government sponsored and owned 
institutions that make investments in sectors and countries that are commonly seen as 
unattractive to other private investors. DFIs participate in activities where there is a general 
lack of capital but where the private sector can be leveraged in. Furthermore, DFIs are 
effective where there is great potential for market failure, where its interventions are 
greatest and in sectors and countries that are geared and in need for development, using 
the instruments that are most appropriate (Kingombe, Massa, & Willem, 2011). In addition 
to financing of projects geared for advancing development, there also exists a significant 
secondary impact that is provided by DFIs, and this is the role of a “pathfinder” in the 
financing sense. Private investors are often comforted by the knowledge of a DFIs prior 
presence in a new market thus enabling second around effect of investors who can 
leverage off established expertise and a coordinated strategy. 
Musasike (2004) defines the fundamental role of DFIs in the market economy as “a tool or 
mechanism to crowd in private financial flows by providing a package of services that not 
only fill the fiscal gap between capital for pure pubic good finance provided by the state on 
the one side and pure commercial projects on the other, but also seek to narrow the gap in 
the finance system”. This gap in the finance system in SSA is also exacerbated by a 
general lack of sovereign credit ratings that are of investment grade, with some countries 
having no ratings in some instances. Thus the cost of funding based on the investor 
appetite is often intolerable in the absence of interventions provided by DFIs. In 2012, over 
USD10 billion came from DFI investments, which represents close to 24% of the total 
external financing of nearly USD30 billion. 
The most prominent DFIs participating in infrastructure financing in SSA are listed below. 
The World Bank’s IBRD is a major contributor, whilst the African Development Bank and 
the Development Bank of South Africa are increasingly finding new methods of funding 
infrastructure in the region.  
 Islamic Development Bank (IBD)  
 World Bank Groups’ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,  
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 Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) 
 Agence Française de Développement (AFD). 
 African Development Bank (AfDB),  
 European Investment Bank (EIB), 
 East African Development Bank (EADB)  
Table 2-3: Funding Commitments by DFIs, 2009 - 2014 
  
Funding Commitments 
(US$Bln) 
% of total Focus DFI 
commitments  
World Bank  20,8 22,5% 
DBSA 16,5 17,8% 
ADB 16,2 17,5% 
AFD 9,1 9,8% 
Others (nine) 30 32,4% 
Total 92,6 100% 
Source: ICA Africa Report 2014 
There have been new financing initiatives to bolster infrastructure growth through 
development finance institutions, and examples include: 
 The Global Infrastructure Facility, which is currently capitalised at USD 100 million 
was established by the World Bank, and focuses on structuring and preparation of 
infrastructure PPPs in developing and emerging markets. 
 The Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa (IIPSA) is a EUR100 
million fund established in partnership with the European Union the South African 
government. The primary purpose of the fund is to provide South African and 
participating European development finance institutions with grant funding and long-
term financing for bankable infrastructure projects in South Africa and the region. 
 The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), is a partnership 
between the African Union Commission, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating 
Agency, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African 
Development Bank. The programme seeks to develop a vision, strategies, policies, 
and a programme for priority African infrastructure development.  
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 The Africa50 Infrastructure Fund with a fund reported fund value of USD 87 million 
established in 2013 by PIDA aims to provide project finance expertise as well as 
project development support for commercially sustainable African infrastructure. 
 The Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) provides funding of USD 10 million - 
USD 50 million, with terms of 15-20 years for private sector businesses established 
by the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG). These are granted at 
standardized commercial terms. 
 The Global Infrastructure Fund invests in infrastructure projects across the globe.  
2.4 Private Infrastructure Financing in Africa  
Barring South Africa and Nigeria, SSA is characterised by a Private sector that is relatively 
underdeveloped and small in size. Ndulu (2006) observes that developing countries 
typically have small private sectors and thus the domestic public sector has been the 
prevailing source of infrastructure, accounting for 70% of current spending. Globally the 
private sector accounts for 20–25% and official development assistance (ODA) for 5–10% 
(Briceno et al., 2004). The situation is grimmer when one looks at the size of the private 
sector in SSA in particular.  
In their study of the examination of how the institutional environment affects private sector 
participation in infrastructure projects in developing economies (40 in total with 6 being from 
SSA) Banerjee et al (2006) surprisingly find that the more corrupt countries have higher 
levels of PPI.  African states have consistently ranked poorly on the corruption index 
(barring for Seychelles, Rwanda, Mauritius and Namibia, no African state is rated in top 50 
countries with low corruption) however this factor alone cannot be solely reliable as a 
determinant for infrastructure investment.  
A key challenge associated with infrastructure financing in SSA has been the determination 
of the appropriate pricing placed on provision of services stemming from the infrastructure 
outputs. Investors are keenly interested on Return on investment. There is a need for 
improved metering and billing in the infrastructure services provided in Africa however this 
does not necessarily guarantee optimal use of revenue without appropriate institutional 
frameworks that foster accountability and simplified regulatory procedures (Anderson, 
Bank, & Collier, 1989). Eberhard and Shkaratan (2012) support this notion in identifying 
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sound pricing as a prerequisite for raising the finance necessary to meet investment 
requirements (i.e. Return on Investment). They further argue that predominantly in the 
energy sector under-recovery of costs has had serious implications for the financial health 
of utilities and has had the impact of slowing the pace of service expansion. 
However in an analysis of the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing 
countries Asiedu (2002) found that infrastructure development and a higher return on 
investment have no real effect on FDI in SSA. This counter-intuitive result is argued to be 
driven by uncertainty of government policy in SSA countries.  Due to the long term nature of 
Infrastructure projects, longer payback and build periods as well as the likelihood of the 
services to be of a public good, there is a predisposition for political and regulatory 
interference, which increases the regulatory risk such investments may be facing 
(Sheppard, Klaudy, & Kumar, 2006) 
Due to its complex nature, infrastructure finance lends itself to high risk, more especially in 
SSA when considering the institutional challenges. Project bankability is the catalyst to 
successful financing and implementation of projects in SSA.  Collier (2014) maintains that 
the following tools; standardization, subsidized risk insurance, re-bundling, commitment 
devices and appropriate accounting, would enable SSA countries to de-risk projects and 
improve their bankability.  He also argues that the challenge is for a coordinated 
organizational design that will ensure that Africa’s infrastructural need is met.   
(Ratha, Mohapatra, & Plaza, 2008) attribute the shortage of private capital attraction in SSA 
financial markets that are shallow, securitization laws that are inadequate or unenforceable, 
banks and firms which are of investment grade, and an absence of national credit-rating 
agencies. However, they continue to argue that SSA countries need create an environment 
that is attractive to a broader set of investors such institutional investors and pension funds 
as well as expand public-private partnerships as additional sources of funding. 
2.5 Understanding Public Private Partnerships 
Since the popularity in the 1990s PPPs have evolved and have gone through various 
permutations. However, PPPs can be traced back to the early 16th and 17th centuries in 
Europe, with France being a prime example of use of concessionary programs in expansive 
public works such as canal construction, road paving, waste collection, public lighting, mail 
distribution and public transportation. 
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A few definitions have been provided in literature:  
 “A long-term contractual arrangement between the public and the private sector to realize 
public infrastructure and services more cost effectively and efficiently than under 
conventional procurement” (Daube, Vollrath, & Alfen, 2007) 
“A long-term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management 
responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance". PPP Knowledge Lab  
Yescombe, (2002), provides a more explanatory definition and outlines a PPP as follows: 
 a long-term contract (a “PPP contract”) between a public and private sector party 
 for the design, construction, financing and operation of public infrastructure (“facility”) 
by the private sector party 
 with payments over the life of the PPP contract to the private sector for the use of the 
facility, made either by the public sector party or by the general public users of the 
facility 
 with the Facility remaining in public sector ownership, or reverting to public sector 
ownership at the end of the PPP contract 
Under the above construct the public sector procures a set of services from the private 
sector to fulfil its infrastructure demands as opposed to a purchase of assets. This purchase 
includes the provision of financing and operation of the underlying infrastructure for a 
predetermined period.  
The structure of the PPP arrangement can take different forms of participation. An outline of 
the most common methods is provided below. 
 Build–Develop–Operate: Operation of the asset is preceded by a purchase or lease 
of an existing asset by the private sector party from the public agency and a capital 
injection with the purpose of enhancement and development of the infrastructure 
asset.   
 Build–Own–Operate: The private party is mandated a single contract with provisions 
of both construction and operation of the infrastructure asset by the public agency.  
The design of the project is specified by the public agency however ownership rests 
with the private party.  
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 Build–Operate–Transfer: The structure is similar to the Build Own Operate structure 
however operation of the infrastructure asset is for a specified period of time under a 
contract or franchise agreement with the agency. Upon termination of the contract, 
ownership and operation of the infrastructure is transferred to the public agency. 
2.6 Project Finance as a funding tool. 
Project finance has been defined as an essential technique for financing projects that are 
capital intensive, long-term and are not of a small-scale, with the key-differentiating factor 
being the efficiency of how risk allocation is distributed between all the relevant 
stakeholders (Shen-fa & Xiao-ping, 2009). Simplistically, it is the funding of a project on the 
basis of its expected future cash flows.  However Esty & Christov (2002) further elaborates 
on this definition by expressing it as the creation of an independent special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), which is financed through equity stakes and debt provisions from banks and project 
sponsors on a non-recourse basis with the aim of financing a specific capital asset over a 
long tenor.   
Figure 2.3 provides a visual representation of the typical structure of a project finance deal 
with the relevant stakeholders. The various stakeholders have different interests both from 
a returns perspective and the associated contractual structures. 
 
Figure 2-3: The structure of a Project Finance deal 
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Source: (Daube et al., 2007) 
Ultimately, Project finance is designed to reduce transaction costs associated with long 
term financing, specifically those arising from agency costs such as lack of information on 
optimal investment and capital allocation, as well as insufficient monitoring and 
enforcement of corporate governance (Kleimeier & Versteeg, 2010). 
Sawant (2010) defines project finance as the financing of a single-purpose infrastructure 
asset with a finite life through separate incorporation non-recourse or limited recourse debt, 
high debt levels, and detailed long-term contracts; the composition of such assets is not 
altered during the course of the SPV's life. 
Risk allocation is often sighted as the principle advantages of Project Finance. This is 
achieved through a number of contractual arrangements that apportion risk to various 
stakeholders participating in the financing structure (i.e. construction and completion risk, 
operating and revenue risk, pricing and foreign risk). The contractual structure helps to 
allocate risk to the participants who are best suited to handle it. These features fit well in the 
African context given the relatively higher risk of financing capital.  
Criteria such as the investment volume and the allocation of risks as well as the individual 
risk-return-structure of the investor affect the involvement of different forms and sources of 
capital. With project finance lenders are interested in equity stakes that are commensurate 
the risks associated with the project. Riskier projects intrinsically require the borrower to 
“put more skin in the game” as compared to lower risk projects. A 10–15% equity stake has 
been the acceptable threshold by the sponsor in practice. Project finance deals are highly 
leveraged and in the case of large deals the shortfall between equity and debt can be filled 
with mezzanine-capital (Daube et al., 2007) 
Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010) argue that intrinsic characteristics of project finance make it 
a useful financing for augmentation of deficient institutional and financial development 
factors prevalent in developing markets.  They further argue based on a sample of 90 
countries that project finance is an effective tool to deal with high-risk environments. In spite 
of these critical features that are SSA has lagged behind the rest of the world in this regard. 
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Figure 2-4: SSA Project Finance transaction volume, 2008-2015 
 
Source: IJ Global (2015) 
Figure 2.4 highlights project finance transaction volumes from 2008 to 2015. SSA project 
finance deals increased in 2015 compared to the previous year, boosted by strong activity 
in the power and renewable energy sectors. Deal count almost doubled from 15 to 28 with 
transaction with volumes totalling USD7.1 billion, compared to USD4.6 billion in 2014. More 
than USD2.2 billion financed 5 power deals and in renewables, USD3.2 billion was spread 
across 14 transactions. Project Finance in SSA peaked in 2012 primarily driven by the 
USD12 billion Oil-Refinery primary financing structure. From 2008 to 2015 a total of 
USD78.8 billion has been invested through project finance with a total count of 204 deal 
structures. This pales in comparison to Latin America with a total of 570 deals with total 
value of USD230 billion. 
Three key limitations exist in Africa’s ability to attract Project finance. First, SSA countries in 
bulk suffer from the demise of low or non-existent sovereign ratings. This results in a 
limitation in financial market accessibility and where sovereign ratings exist, constrained to 
short term financing. Second, SSA countries have shallow capital markets to support the 
long-term financing requirements of project finance. Typically, these are supported by the 
credit enhancements like guarantees. Third, the risk characteristics of a project finance 
structure tend to be more susceptible to political and regulatory interference, which 
increases the regulatory risk such investments need (Sheppard et al., 2006) 
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2.7 Project Bonds in SSA 
Project bonds are defined as a bond issued to capital market investors, which finances (the 
whole or part off) a project financing. The bond can be used for initial project financing 
either co-financing with commercial bank debt or it can be used to refinance to existing 
bank debt, often post construction (Conduit & Lee, 2013).  
Mezui & Hundal (2013) are more specific in defining the characteristics of infrastructure 
project bonds and their use. At a base level project bonds are used for capital raising for 
specific standalone projects; coupons and principal repayments are serviced from the cash 
flows generated by the specific project; and their performance is subject to certain project 
specific risk. 
Croce and Gatti (2014) noted that the demand for project bonds has increased globally due 
to the overall decline of traditional sovereign and corporate bond yields on all major asset 
classes. This has led to fixed income investors seeking investments with better risk/return 
profiles, which have been relatively scarce.  This is in slight contrast with Sawant’s (2010) 
observation that infrastructure bonds do not have a favourable risk-return profile, due to 
political risk and other unique risk factors, however they have low correlation with equities 
and the other asset classes, which makes them valuable as portfolio diversifiers. 
Across most of Sub-Saharan Africa, efforts have centred on reforms of issuing sovereign 
bonds, often with the aim of closing the infrastructure finance gap. However, these reforms 
are not void of challenges. Many sovereign countries in SSA do not have risk ratings. 
Typically, the natural resource rich countries such as Nigeria often need to set up sinking 
funds as a commitment tool of future revenues to secure financing.  
In spite of this, 2012 and the first half of 2013 had significant Eurobond issuances, notably 
Ghana (USD750 million 10 year bonds), Rwanda (USD400 million 10 year bonds), Zambia 
(USD750 million 10 year bonds), Tanzania (USD500 million seven-year private placement) 
and Angola (USD1 billion 7-year private placement). Eurobond issuance in SSA has 
predominately been denominated in dollars, however in February 2013 the IFC issued a 
five-year, local currency NGN12 billion denominated bond (in Nigeria as part of a program 
to deepen the domestic bond market across Africa whilst in September 2013, Kenya issued 
its sixth infrastructure bond for KES20 billion. 
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Figure 2-5: Bond Issuance in SSA (Excl. South Africa), 2007 – 2014 
 
Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting Systems 
Bond issuance in SSA has traditionally been limited to South Africa. However, from the time 
when Ghana debuted with its issuance in 2007, countries in SSA, including those that have 
been helped by the HIPC (Heavily indebted poor countries) and MDRI (Multilateral debt 
relief initiative) debt relief, have quickly latched on to sovereign bond issuance. A 
combination of increased investor appetite for higher returns and softer global market 
conditions have expedited and enabled more efficient access to international capital 
markets. Sovereigns, have issued USD6 billion in 2014, this excludes South Africa.  This is 
equivalent to 25% of foreign direct investment inflows and 29% of disbursements from 
official creditors. The debut sovereign bonds issued by Ethiopia (USD1 billion) and Kenya 
(USD2 billion) were substantially over-subscribed, and the same applied for countries that 
had bond reissuances. Examples of these are Ghana and Zambia. To manage the public 
debt portfolio, and for infrastructure financing, earnings from sovereign bonds are typically 
used to benchmark for future expected corporate and government bond markets issues. 
The 10-year, 6.625% Eurobond issued in December 2014 in Ethiopia, has been reserved 
for development of sugarcane plantations, a hydropower dam, and amelioration and 
extension of the railway network (IDS, 2016). 
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2.8 Institutional Investors and their potential role 
In the quest for higher long-term yield, asset and liability profile matching and duration 
hedging, pension funds and insurance providers have come out as strong contenders for 
sources of infrastructure funding. There has been rapid growth in institutional investment in 
infrastructure finance however this still represents around 1% of total assets. Certain 
pension funds in different countries have adopted investing in infrastructure financing more 
readily than others with the likes of Australia and Canada actively increasing their allocation 
to infrastructure over the recent past with allocations as high as 10-15% (Croce & Yermo, 
2013). 
Figure 2-6: Average Current and Target Allocations to Infrastructure, 2011 - 2014 
 
Source: Preqin Infrastructure Online 
Figure 2.6 highlights trends in infrastructure allocations. Globally the average current 
allocation of investors to infrastructure has increased from 3.5% in 2011 to 4.3% in 2014, 
with the average target allocation increasing from 4.9% to 5.7% over this time period.  
Preqin (2015) asserts that allocations to infrastructure are likely to continue to grow in the 
near future, with 67% of investors from a survey of 148 fund managers confirming plans to 
increase their allocation to infrastructure over the longer term 
Chile provides a prime example of a proactive approach to alternative non-traditional 
sources of funding from an emerging market. With limited access to financial, organizational 
and human resources, Chile was faced with a major infrastructure deficit particularly in the 
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transport sector. Chile embarked on a franchising program through a build-operate-and-
transfer (BOT) contract, which entailed a private firm building and financing an 
infrastructure project and then collecting user fees for a predetermined period (usually 
between 10 and 30 years). On conclusion of the franchise created the infrastructure built is 
transferred to the government.  Over a 10-year period Chile managed to produce 21 BOT 
concessions involving investments of USD3.6 billion, mainly in highways and airports 
(Engel, Fischeer, & Galetovic, 2003). 
SSA has significant structural challenges when considering the viability of pension funds as 
potential infrastructure investors. Structural factors such as the prevalence of state-
controlled pension systems, low quantity of private pension funds, undeveloped capital 
markets and restricted alternatives for financial investment instruments, practices that 
promote holding of illiquid real estates, inadequate regulations for governing investment of 
assets, short-term bank deposits and government securities, have contributed to pension 
funds in SSA remaining largely underdeveloped (Irving & Manroth, 2009). 
Table 2.4 highlights the key pension funds in SSA. South Africa has the largest assets 
under management (USD312 billion), with a distant second being Nigeria with USD14 
billion. This highlights the disparity in the sophistication of the pension fund markets across 
SSA.  
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Table 2-4: Key Pension Funds in SSA 
 
2.9 The role of China in infrastructure in SSA 
China has emerged as an important financier of SSA’s infrastructure requirements in recent 
years. Since the late 1990s Chinese and SSA trade relations have strengthened so 
significantly that China became SSA’s largest export and development partner in 2013. This 
has been spurred by China’s rapid industrialization program. China’s GDP growth over the 
past 10 years has averaged 10%. Nearly a third of China’s energy imports come from SSA, 
which is a vital trade link, especially as energy consumption rates in China have grown by 
more than twice the global average over the past 10 years. The existence of domestic 
production and large efficiency gains has not curtailed China’s appetite for raw materials 
such as coal, oil and natural gas. Heavy industrialization combined with urbanization 
continues to be the main drivers for large raw material consumption. Chinese banks such 
as the People’s Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank 
- 35 - 
of China (Exim Bank of China), funded large scale African infrastructure projects (Pigato & 
Tang, 2015). 
China’s most common form of funding structure for SSA has been through the infrastructure 
for resources loan model. This loan structure makes use of two basic legal instruments: a 
bilateral framework cooperation agreement stating the general terms (volume, purpose, 
interest rate and maturity) and a loan agreement signed by the China Exim Bank and the 
borrower. A key feature to the structure of these loans is that the interest rate is typically 
below the benchmark of the People’s Bank of China, with the difference being subsidized 
by the Chinese central government. The repayment period is characteristically long, ranging 
between 15 to 20 years, including a 5 to 7-year grace period. Structured mostly as an 
export credit facility, these credit lines come tied to the procurement of services, goods and 
often labour from China (a minimum of 50%), leaving in general only a small margin for 
local content in the recipient country. The capital never actually leaves China. It is 
administered on a project basis through the borrower’s account with Exim Bank in China, 
and payments are made directly to Chinese contractors against completion of the 
construction project (Alves, 2013). 
China accounts for 34% of the total official financing amount on infrastructure in SSA, 
higher than any other funder. However, China accounts for only 3% of the number of aid 
projects, indicating that the size of Chinese funded projects is larger. The USA is the 
second largest bi-lateral infrastructure contributor, but its total aid volume during the period 
is far less than that of China. Northern donors together contribute to 28% of the total aid 
amount in infrastructure, but they account for 76% of the number of aid projects, indicating 
the small scale of these projects (Chen 2013). 
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Figure 2-7: Chinese Commitments to Africa Infrastructure by Sector, 2011 - 2014 
 
Source: ICA 2014 
Chinese commitments whilst significant have reduced over the past few years. Figure 2.7 
illustrates that commitments have reduced from a high of USD14 billion to USD3.9 billion in 
2014. The transport and energy sector together account for over 80% of the investments. 
The most significant investments in transport in 2014 were for a USD875 million loan for the 
expansion of Côte d’Ivoire’s Autonomous Port of Abidjan and a USD700 million loan to 
finance construction of a new airport in Khartoum, Sudan. Within the energy sector, USD41 
million loan was granted to the Zambian government to construct electricity transmission 
lines and a USD136 million loan to the Tanzanian government for the construction of the 
50MW Singida wind farm project. However, it should be noted that different sources report 
different commitment values due to the lack of full disclosure on Chinese investments in 
SSA.  
1149 
94 0 
148 
424 411 
1851 
5158 
2577 
477 
743 
1254 
361 
108 
12323 
5651 
9987 
2095 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
2011 2012 2013 2014
Multi Sector ICT Energy Water Transport
- 37 - 
CHAPTER 3. Research Methodology 
In relation to Infrastructure finance as an asset class Inderst (2013) argues that the one 
major challenges in assessing infrastructure finance mechanisms is that Infrastructure as a 
separate category is a relatively new occurrence. Infrastructure finance will typically be 
broadly categorised under other asset classes such as equities, bonds, private equity, real 
estate, alternative or real/inflation-linked assets.  
When dealing with infrastructure financing the prime constraint is data. This is due to the 
absence of a central database. Thus there is a reliance on multiple data sources.  However 
there have been improvements in the quality of the provision of data. The primary data 
source is the World Bank database that has time-series project level data, which spans the 
period 1984 to 2014. The World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database 
tracks contract and investment information for private infrastructure projects in low and 
middle-income countries. 
The research focuses on one of the financing mechanisms that have been discussed in the 
literature review. We investigate the determinants of PPP infrastructure financing in SSA 
making use of the 80/20 principle (i.e. Focus on countries with 80% of total infrastructure 
finance through PPP from 1991 to 2014 in SSA which total 10 countries). This paper 
analyses the application two models as well as their suitability. Both models employ a multi-
country regression in a panel framework. In the first model we analyse factors that affect 
the number of projects that are completed in a PPP structure. In the second model we look 
at the variables that determine the investment dollar value in PPP.  
Figure 3.1 presents the top 10 SSA countries by PPP investment commitment to be 
analysed in the multi-country regression. A total of 290 projects were completed in the 
period of analysis with investment commitment of USD130 Billion. South Africa and Nigeria 
as expected hold the largest share of total investment amount in the period of analysis.  
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Figure 3-1: Top 10 SSA Countries - PPP Investment Commitments and Annual 
Project Count, 1991 -2014 
 
Recent studies such as those by (Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, & Yehoue, 2006; Kasri & 
Wibowo, 2015; Mengitsu, 2013), have noted that there are four critical explanatory factors 
that determine PPP investment and the associated number of projects, namely, 
government resource constraints; macroeconomic conditions; market conditions and 
institutional factors. Due to data limitations Hammami et al., 2006 propose a few proxy 
indicators across these factors and for this paper we conform to the indicators chosen by 
Kasri and Wibowo (2015).  Based on data availability for the 10 countries we review the 
variables with their a-priori expectations in table 2 below.  
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Table 3-1: Data Description 
Factor Proxy Indicator Unit Data Source aPriori 
Expectation 
Dependent Variables  
PPP Project Count Number of PPP 
Projects 
Annual Count World Bank PPI 
Database 2016 
  
PPP Project 
Investment 
Amounts of PPP 
Projects 
$ Million World Bank PPI 
Database 2016 
  
Explanatory Variables  
Government 
Resource 
Constraints 
AID  % of GNI World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Negative 
External Debt % of GNI World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Negative 
Fuel Export % of 
merchandise 
exports 
World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Negative 
Macroeconomic 
Conditions 
Inflation  Annual % World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
% of GNI 
World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016  
Positive 
M2 – Money Supply % of GNI World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
Market Conditions 
GDP Per Capita Logged USD 
PPP constant 
World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
Population Logged annual 
count 
World Bank Development 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
Institutional Factors 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index Number 
(-2.5<I<2.5) 
World Wide Governance 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
Regulation Quality Index Number 
(-2.5<I<2.5) 
World Wide Governance 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
Stable Political 
Environment 
Index Number 
(-2.5<I<2.5) 
World Wide Governance 
Indicators Database 2016 
Positive 
To estimate the determinants of PPP we use the below specification for both the count and 
Investment amount models. 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡 
 
Where GovConstraint represents the government resource constraint proxies, MacroCondi 
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represents the macroeconomic condition proxies, MarketCondi represents the market 
condition proxies and InstFactors represents the institutional factors proxies. Key 
differences in analysis for both models rest in the methodology employed.  
Since the project count data is ordinal in nature the relevant models typically used for such 
analysis in econometric literature are the poisson distribution, negative binomial regression, 
zero inflated count models and zero truncated count models. Recent studies (Kasri & 
Wibowo, 2015) have used the random-poisson model and we restrict our study to the same 
in this paper. To analyze the determinants of the investment amounts, the paper follows the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) methodology.  This is to deal with the general problem of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in Panel Data. This is in line with methodologies 
followed by Hammami et al., 2006; Mengitsu, 2013; Kasri & Wibowo, 2015. However a 
caveat is required with regards to this remedy, as this imposes a distribution on the error 
terms which may not be observable or readily testable and, in the event of misspecification 
which may lead to incorrect standard errors and biased coefficients.  
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CHAPTER 4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
There has been a steady increase in the number of PPP projects completed in the period of 
analysis.  Figure 4.1 highlights the trend in the number of PPP projects. However there 
have been periods of steep increases and declines. Between 2005 and 2011 there was a 
steep decline in the number of completed projects. However, 2012 saw the largest number 
of projects completed, a total of 34, with the 26 of these being completed in South Africa in 
the renewables energy sector.  1992, 2002 and 2010, had the lowest number of projects at 
4 with an average of 12 projects per throughout the period.  
Figure 4-1: Number of PPP projects for the Top 10 countries, 1991 - 2014 
 
The trend is slightly skewed when looking at the investment amounts in the top 10 
countries. Figure 4.2 highlights the investment amounts in PPP projects. There has been 
extreme volatility in the investment amounts however this is explained by the presence of 
South Africa in the countries analysed. South Africa and Nigeria typically has had larger 
projects in relation to the other 8 sampled countries. Total investments between 1991 and 
2014 amounted to USD139 billion with a peak in 2001, driven by the MTN Nigeria 
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greenfield project in the telecoms sector, of USD21 billion. The average investment amount 
for the period was USD5 billion. A gradual increase in PPP investment amounts can be 
observed between 2003 and 2007, which is coincidentally a period associated with the 
commodity boom, before downturn as a result of the financial crisis in 2008.  
Figure 4-2: Investment amounts of PPP projects for the Top 10 countries, 1991 - 2014 
 
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the explanatory 
variables between 1991 and 2014. For the government constraints factors on average the 
top ten countries had 6.86% and 67.33% of their GNI in foreign aid and external debt 
respectively. However, there is great dispersion on the external debt between the 10 
countries with an average max of 108% for Cote d’Ivoire and min of 24% for South Africa. 
With respect to fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports, there is an average of 
24.81%, however this variable also suffers from the same dispersion issues as the external 
debt variable as a result of countries such as Nigeria and Sudan with large oil exports. 
 For the macroeconomic conditions inflation stood at 13.17% with a trough of -3.21%, whilst 
average domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GNI stood 30.46%, which 
speaks to the extent of the development of the financial markets. For market conditions the 
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GDP per capita between the countries averaged USD3,244 however, this is skewed 
upwards by South Africa with an average of USD10,826. It is however worth noting that this 
is below the average income of developing countries of USD6,597 globally (Kasri & 
Wibowo, 2015). The population variable, which serves as proxy for market size, averages 
37 million across the top 10 countries with Nigeria being an outlier with an average 
population of 133 million over the period of analysis. 
With respect to the institutional factors, the top 10 countries seem to have a general 
weakness across all the chosen proxies.  All the institutional factors range between -2.5 (a 
weakness) and 2.5 (a strength). The government effectiveness index as defined by the 
World Bank “reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies”. For the top 10 countries the index of government effectiveness averaged -0.42. 
South Africa is the only country in the sample with a positive average. The stable political 
environment index, which measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism, had an average of -0.74 lowered 
by Nigeria’s average of -1.33. The regulatory quality index reflects perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. The average index for this proxy is -0.34 and has 
the least dispersion from the three proxies chosen. This is summarized in table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4-1: Summary Statistics for the Determinants of PPP investments, 1991 - 2014 
Variables 
 
N Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Std. 
Dev. 
Government 
resource 
Constraints 
AID  % of GNI 227 6.86 5.92 30.22 0.21 5.56 
External 
Debt 
% of GNI 236 67.33 58.60 251.29 4.29 50.08 
Fuel Export 
% of 
merchandise 
exports 
191 24.81 10.99 99.66 0.00 30.84 
Macroecono
mics 
Conditions 
Inflation  Annual % 237 13.17 7.71 132.82 -3.21 19.65 
Domestic 
credit to 
private sector 
% of GNI 111 30.46 13.24 160.12 2.97 42.86 
M2 Money 
Supply  
% of GNI 111 30.54 23.22 80.80 12.66 16.86 
Market 
Conditions 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Logged USD 
PPP constant 
240 7.88 7.79 9.43 6.67 0.58 
Population 
Logged annual 
count 
240 17.16 17.10 18.99 15.86 0.68 
Institutional 
Factors 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index Number 
(-2.5<I<2.5) 
190 -0.42 -0.41 0.88 -1.61 0.52 
Stable 
Political 
Environment 
Index Number 
(-2.5<I<2.5) 
190 -0.74 -0.53 0.20 -2.66 0.77 
Regulation 
Quality 
Index Number 
(-2.5<I<2.5) 
190 -0.34 -0.25 0.78 -1.51 0.49 
4.1.1 Determinants of PPP Investments (Top 10 countries in SSA) 
Table 3 provides a summary of the regression outputs of the estimated model for PPP 
investments for the Top 10 countries in SSA. For robustness the regressions are performed 
with both Fixed Effects OLS and Fixed Effects GLS. The results are consistent across both 
methodologies. The results shared suggest that government constraints, macroeconomic 
conditions and institutional factors do have an impact on the PPP investments in the top 10 
countries. More specifically is that the more aid provided, the larger the fuel exports as a 
percentage of merchandise, the higher the domestic credit to the private sector (i.e. depth 
of financial market) and the more effective the government efficiency, the higher are the 
levels of PPP investment. A surprising outcome from the estimation is that high external 
indebtedness is associated with lower PPP investment. This can be explained by that in 
most instances PPPs are debt to the government (even though in many cases the 
government sets up an SPV that becomes the de facto debt issuer) and, although the cash 
flows from funded projects are “ring-fenced” for purposes of paying off the debt, it is likely 
that many fund suppliers would hesitate to lend more to countries/governments that have 
already issued plenty of debt in international debt markets. Alternatively, they will demand a 
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higher rate of return that might be a deterrent to using PPPs. This is because heavily 
indebted governments have a higher risk of default making additional debt riskier.   
Thus our estimated model suggests that a 1% increase in aid will result in 0.5% increase in 
PPP investment, whilst an increase in external debt reduces PPP investment by 0.06%. It is 
also worth noting that whilst external debt seems to have negative results on PPP 
investments domestic credit to the private sector and the ability to lend has a positive 
relation with PPP investment, which speaks to a need to develop domestic financial 
markets.  
A key result is the statistical significance of the government effectiveness as a determinant 
of PPP investment. A unit increase in government effectiveness results in a 19% increase 
in PPP investment, on the average, in the 10 countries. This highlights the sensitivity of 
PPP stakeholders to the ability of the government to deliver against its mandated 
obligations within a PPP framework.  
The estimation does present counter intuitive results that will require further analysis. One 
of these is that market conditions have no significant impact on PPP investments for the top 
10 countries. Previous literature as that of Mengistu, finds that countries that are more open 
to trade, countries with larger populations, and democracies, are more likely to receive PPP 
investment. 
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Table 4-2: Regression output for the Determinants of PPP Investment amounts, 2001 
- 2014 
Dependent Variable: Log of PPP Investment amount; Model: Fixed Effect – OLS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -202.4679 214.1184 -0.945588 0.3474 
AID  0.506132 0.245716 2.059823** 0.0428 
External Debt -0.061378 0.029763 -2.062205** 0.0426 
Inflation  0.17037 0.118703 1.435259 0.1553 
Fuel Export 0.110683 0.045148 2.451579** 0.0165 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.193889 0.088399 2.193326** 0.0313 
GDP Per Capita -16.14158 9.858192 -1.637377 0.1057 
Population 18.79823 15.40826 1.22001 0.2262 
Government Effectiveness 19.73324 6.824212 2.891651*** 0.0050 
Stable Political Environment -1.857236 2.497613 -0.743605 0.4594 
Regulation Quality -0.964546 5.338359 -0.180682 0.8571 
R-Square  0.338855 
Observations  94 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of PPP Investment Amount Model: Fixed Effect - GLS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -218.6137 192.718 -1.134371 0.2603 
AID  0.734909 0.233223 3.151108*** 0.0023 
External Debt -0.055389 0.027325 -2.027070** 0.0462 
Inflation  0.192454 0.117112 1.643332 0.1045 
Fuel Export 0.088994 0.041854 2.126266** 0.0368 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.194034 0.140201 1.383972 0.1705 
GDP Per Capita -14.51287 9.220157 -1.574038 0.1197 
Population 18.91728 13.8603 1.364854 0.1764 
Government Effectiveness 18.33462 6.391881 2.868423*** 0.0054 
Stable Political Environment -2.201283 2.227099 -0.988409 0.3261 
Regulation Quality 0.692706 5.257094 0.131766 0.8955 
R-Square  0.395420 
Observations  94 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
To test for the sensitivity of outliers we run the same regressions with the exclusion of 
South Africa in the analysis. Government constraints together with Macroeconomic factors 
remain significant determinants of PPP investment amounts. However, the exclusion of 
South Africa seems to reveal a pronounced impact played by market conditions on PPP 
investments. Of significance is the negative relation of GDP Per Capita with PPP 
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Investment (i.e. a unit rise in GDP Per capita will result in a 24% reduction in PPP 
investment). Higher incomes are typically expected to attract higher levels of PPP (Kasri & 
Wibowo, 2015). Due to the high correlation between Aid and GDP per capita this result 
needs to be evaluated with caution as this maybe a misspecification error.  
An expected result is that the political instability affects PPP investment negatively in the 9 
countries and is associated with lower investment. Government effectiveness plays an 
important role with a unit rise resulting in an increase of 17% in PPP investment. It is worth 
noting that financial market depth as well as inflation levels seem to play no significant role 
in determining PPP investment within the 9 countries, however in the same vein monetary 
policy is an instrumental factor. South Africa follows an inflation targeting framework 
therefore there exists some correlation with M2 and Inflation which explains why it is 
insignificant in the joint pool analysis whilst it seems to impact the 9 other countries.  
To check for robustness, a GLS model was also performed and the results did not deviate 
from the OLS model. The R2 of 0.46 does suggest that a GLS model is a better fit than the 
OLS model with only 0.42 however this is only marginal. We also find that the constant has 
close significance in the GLS model, which suggests existence of fixed effects.  
Table 4-3: Regression output the Determinants of PPP investment (excl. SA), 2001 - 
2014 
Dependent Variable: Log of PPP Investment amount, Model: Fixed Effect - OLS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -292.445 213.122 -1.372196 0.1749 
AID  0.553479 0.245599 2.253592** 0.0277 
External Debt -0.068814 0.03037 -2.265856** 0.0269 
Inflation  0.186502 0.123669 1.508076 0.1365 
Fuel Export 0.128349 0.044021 2.915643*** 0.0049 
M2 Money Supply -0.641243 0.370288 -1.73174* 0.0882 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.550636 0.34265 1.606995 0.1131 
GDP Per Capita -24.7053 10.09604 -2.447029** 0.0172 
Population 28.33518 15.37024 1.84351* 0.0700 
Government Effectiveness 17.92992 7.082539 2.531567** 0.0139 
Stable Political Environment -4.398099 2.602602 -1.689886* 0.0960 
Regulation Quality 0.105772 5.822735 0.018165 0.9856 
R-Square  0.428092 
Observations  81 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Dependent Variable: Log of PPP Investment amount, Model: Fixed Effect - GLS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -314.0544 193.6199 -1.622015 0.1098 
AID  0.747622 0.234923 3.18242*** 0.0023 
External Debt -0.064163 0.028352 -2.26305** 0.0271 
Inflation  0.187533 0.118308 1.585117 0.1179 
Fuel Export 0.102185 0.043785 2.333796** 0.0228 
M2 Money Supply -0.661652 0.36432 -1.816129* 0.0741 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.54511 0.343309 1.58781 0.1173 
GDP Per Capita -22.07595 9.816496 -2.248863** 0.0280 
Population 28.35487 14.042 2.01929* 0.0477 
Government Effectiveness 17.48006 6.519342 2.681261*** 0.0094 
Stable Political Environment -4.752661 2.360377 -2.013518** 0.0483 
Regulation Quality -0.117498 5.68758 -0.020659 0.9836 
R-Square  0.468677 
Observations  81 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
4.1.2 Determinants of number of PPP Projects (Top 10 countries in SSA) 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the regression outputs of the estimated model for the 
number of completed PPP projects for the Top 10 countries in SSA between 1991 and 
2014. It is worth noting that the correlation between the number of completed projects and 
dollar investment amount is low. The reason for this unexpected result is that the number of 
PPP projects relates to the completed projects in a particular year, which would relate to 
backdated investment commitments.  Thus results of the outputs for dollar investment 
amounts and for project count are not expected to mirror each other.  
Due to the presence of autocorrelation (implying that the number of PPPs attracted by a 
country in a given year might depend on the number of PPPs already running), we 
introduce a one period lag term of the number of PPP projects as an independent variable. 
We perform two regressions, with one excluding SA to control for the outlier effect. Our 
results indicate that previous success in completing a PPP project positively impacts the 
number of current implementations. Macroeconomic factors such as inflation and money 
supply seem to be strong determinants of the number of PPP projects, in the SA inclusive 
model, pointing to monetary policy being a significant determinant. Market conditions 
contribute significantly to through per capita income levels and populations to the number of 
PPP projects. Higher populations are associated with higher number of PPP projects, 
specifically a 10% rise in the population will increase the number of PPP projects by 9 units.  
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Though close to zero the number of PPP projects is positively associated with foreign aid, 
however this result does not hold when excluding South Africa from the analysis. 
Government budget government constraints through external debt are negatively related to 
the number of PPP projects, highlighting indebtedness as a constraint to completion. A 
government’s ability to repay its debts may affect its ability to support PPP projects from 
beginning to completion. Surprisingly institutional factors seem to have no statistically 
significant role in determining the number of projects completed for the top 10 countries. 
This result is consistent even when we control for South Africa as an outlier. 
Table 4-4: Regression output, the number of PPP projects, 2001 - 2014 
Dependent Variable: Number of PPP Projects Model: Poisson  
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Lag of Number of PPP Projects 0.040495 0.012934 3.13081*** 0.0017 
AID  0.076249 0.037333 2.042388** 0.0411 
External Debt 0.000696 0.004724 0.147403 0.8828 
Inflation  0.047612 0.01912 2.490136** 0.0128 
Fuel Export -0.000866 0.008362 -0.10354 0.9175 
M2 Money Supply -0.064589 0.021745 -2.970345*** 0.0030 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.043860 0.010075 4.353238*** 0.0000 
GDP Per Capita -0.424778 0.586378 -0.724411 0.4688 
Population 0.910389 0.246487 3.693452*** 0.0002 
Government Effectiveness -0.689246 0.692739 -0.994958 0.3198 
Stable Political Environment 0.361448 0.238514 1.515414 0.1297 
Regulation Quality 0.070694 0.659646 0.10717 0.9147 
C -12.68693 5.859919 -2.165035** 0.0304 
R-Square  0.279608 
Observations  94 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4-5: Regression output, the number of PPP projects (excl. SA), 2001 - 2014 
Dependent Variable: Number of PPP Projects Model: Poisson  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Lag of Number of PPP Projects 0.092935 0.031888 2.91439*** 0.0036 
AID  -0.020218 0.047871 -0.422332 0.6728 
External Debt -0.010455 0.00636 -1.643878* 0.1002 
Inflation  0.050256 0.019995 2.513435** 0.0120 
Fuel Export 0.012081 0.008823 1.369256 0.1709 
M2 Money Supply 0.002843 0.05871 0.048422 0.9614 
Domestic credit to private sector -0.023868 0.061058 -0.390904 0.6959 
GDP Per Capita -1.820085 0.718928 -2.531664** 0.0114 
Population 0.714133 0.261148 2.734596*** 0.0062 
Government Effectiveness 1.118765 0.89127 1.255249 0.2094 
Stable Political Environment 0.176549 0.277769 0.635597 0.5250 
Regulation Quality -0.211912 0.726443 -0.291712 0.7705 
C 2.301235 6.788233 0.339003 0.7346 
R-Square  0.536092 
Observations  81 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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CHAPTER 5. Conclusions 
5.1 Policy Recommendations  
The results presented provide an interesting base for policy framework discussions and 
associated implications. It is no mystery that key limitations to SSA’s growth trajectory is 
intrinsically linked to its inadequate and fragmented infrastructure.  
Institutional stability and quality provides an environment of predictability and certainty. 
Infrastructure finance is long-term in nature and investors are sensitive to the uncertainty 
premium caused by weak institutions. Whilst our results did not provide strong evidence for 
cross-institutional dependency for PPP investments it has been widely accepted that 
institutional factors are critical determinants for investor appetite (Asiedu, 2002; Basfilio, 
2011; Hammami et al., 2006; Kasri & Wibowo, 2015). Building robust institutional capacity 
across government effectiveness is a critical requirement. This will not only accomplish 
government credibility but will also create an environment that fosters much needed critical 
innovation within the space of infrastructure finance. When a trusted environment is formed, 
a culture of innovation bred.  
With constrained government budgets private participation in infrastructure finance is 
increasingly becoming a necessity. Investors seem to have a herd mentality with where 
they place their proverbial eggs. There is a significant positive relationship with foreign aid 
and private investors infrastructure placement. This highlights a dual need for government’s 
ability to attract both aid and investment simultaneously. Aid in recent years has been 
channelled to countries that have perceptions of good economic governance (Dollar & 
Levin, 2006). Economic governance refers to a country’s ability to support economic activity 
and transactions through stable policy frameworks and institutions. This study highlights a 
negative relationship between external indebtedness and investment. Prudent fiscal 
consolidation thus becomes a critical policy position for SSA countries to ensure stability of 
the national fiscus to promote aid and investment.  
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5.2 Concluding Remarks 
This study explores the prevailing infrastructure finance methods in SSA. The infrastructure 
bottleneck has been an inhibitor to SSAs growth trajectory. Traditionally governments have 
been the main funders of infrastructure finance in SSA, however as government budgets 
become tighter and funding capacity wanes, there is a renewed need for more innovative 
sources of infrastructure financing. These sources will need to come from both the private 
sector through non-traditional sources such as institutional investors and project bonds, as 
well as the public sector in their fiscal policy structures to support the various social and 
economic needs. We have seen an emergence of the east through China as a significant 
funder in recent years, bringing a different philosophy to mutually beneficial structures of 
funding the infrastructure in the region.  
This study through an analysis of the top 10 recipients of PPP investments in SSA between 
1991 and 2014 finds that government budget constraints, macroeconomic conditions and 
institutional quality are significant determinants of PPP investments. Policy implications are 
that SSA governments need to focus on building and maintaining sound fiscal and 
monetary discipline. Institutional factors cannot be ignored in this process, as these are 
critical to creating an environment that is conducive to building trust and reducing risk 
perceptions for potential investors as well as providing the room for innovative solutions.  
Whilst this area of study is plagued with limitations due to inadequate data and academic 
literature, findings in this analysis contribute to the ever-growing body of work on 
Infrastructure financing in SSA.  This paper focused in PPP analysis however there is 
scope to further study other infrastructure financing mechanisms in SSA. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 53 - 
Definition of terms 
ADF African Development Fund 
AfDB African Development Bank 
CADF  China Africa Development Fund 
CDB China Development Bank 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EXIM Bank  Export-Import Bank 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
IATI  International Aid Transparency Initiative 
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
ICA Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
ICB International Competitive Bidding 
ICT Information Communications Technologies 
IDA International Development Association (World Bank) 
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IEF Index of Economic Freedom 
IFC International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
IFI International Finance Institution 
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean 
LDC Least Developed Countries 
LMIC Low and Middle Income Country 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD-DAC The OECD Development Assistance Committee 
PIU Parallel implementation units (PIUs) 
PPI Private Participation in Infrastructure 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
SSA Sub Saharan Africa 
WDI World Development Indicators 
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Appendix 
Table 5-1: Correlation Table 
  
Log 
Investment 
Amount 
Investment 
Count 
Aid 
Externa
l Debt 
Inflation Fuel 
M2 
Money 
Supply 
Domesti
c Credit 
to 
private 
sector 
Log 
GDP 
Per 
Capit
a 
Log 
Populatio
n 
Government 
Effectivenes
s 
Stable 
Political 
Environ
ment 
Regulator
y Quality 
Log Investment 
Amount 1.000 0.178 
-
0.041 -0.217 0.099 0.176 0.082 0.061 0.115 0.255 0.016 -0.153 0.003 
Investment Count 0.178 1.000 
-
0.092 -0.086 -0.007 
-
0.027 0.254 0.308 0.262 0.208 0.192 0.091 0.173 
Aid -0.041 -0.092 1.000 0.246 0.024 
-
0.409 -0.495 -0.505 
-
0.753 -0.407 -0.068 0.083 -0.026 
External Debt -0.217 -0.086 0.246 1.000 0.073 0.141 -0.257 -0.228 
-
0.283 -0.354 -0.165 -0.111 -0.314 
Inflation 0.099 -0.007 0.024 0.073 1.000 0.074 -0.050 -0.174 
-
0.055 0.156 -0.089 -0.121 -0.084 
Fuel 0.176 -0.027 
-
0.409 0.141 0.074 1.000 -0.273 -0.212 0.177 0.427 -0.646 -0.664 -0.703 
M2 Money Supply 0.082 0.254 
-
0.495 -0.257 -0.050 
-
0.273 1.000 0.955 0.820 0.228 0.746 0.391 0.716 
Domestic Credit 
to private sector 0.061 0.308 
-
0.505 -0.228 -0.174 
-
0.212 0.955 1.000 0.862 0.215 0.744 0.387 0.677 
Log GDP Per 
Capita 0.115 0.262 
-
0.753 -0.283 -0.055 0.177 0.820 0.862 1.000 0.414 0.505 0.217 0.405 
Log Population 0.255 0.208 
-
0.407 -0.354 0.156 0.427 0.228 0.215 0.414 1.000 -0.133 -0.394 -0.066 
Government 
Effectiveness 0.016 0.192 
-
0.068 -0.165 -0.089 
-
0.646 0.746 0.744 0.505 -0.133 1.000 0.741 0.931 
Stable Political 
Environment -0.153 0.091 0.083 -0.111 -0.121 
-
0.664 0.391 0.387 0.217 -0.394 0.741 1.000 0.651 
Regulatory 
Quality 0.003 0.173 
-
0.026 -0.314 -0.084 
-
0.703 0.716 0.677 0.405 -0.066 0.931 0.651 1.000 
 
 
- 60 - 
Table 5-2: Investment Count Variable Correlogram 
 
 
 
